Social choice theory

Social choice theory or social choice is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense.[1] Whereas choice theory is concerned with individuals making choices based on their preferences, social choice theory is concerned with how to translate the preferences of individuals into the preferences of a group. A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Another example is voting, where individual preferences over candidates are collected to elect a person that best represents the group's preferences.[2]

Part of the Politics series
Politics
Outline Index Category
Primary topics Outline of political science Index of politics articles Politics by country Politics by subdivision Political economy Political history Political history of the world Political philosophy
Political systems Anarchy City-state Democracy Dictatorship Directorial Federacy Feudalism Hybrid regime Meritocracy Monarchy Parliamentary Presidential Republic Semi-parliamentary Semi-presidential Theocracy
Academic disciplines Political science (political scientists) International relations (theory) Comparative politics Political analysis Political theory Policy studies Political psychology Political sociology
Public administration Bureaucracy (street-level) Technocracy Adhocracy
Policy Public policy (doctrine) Domestic policy Foreign policy Civil society Public interest
Government branches Separation of powers Legislature Executive Judiciary Election commission
Related topics Sovereignty Polity / State (Politeia / Nation / Civilization / Territorial / Quasi / Warlord) Theories of political behavior Biology and political orientation Political organisations Critique of political economy
Subseries Electoral systems Elections voting Unitarism Federalism Government forms Ideology Political campaigning Political parties
Politics portal
v t e

Social choice blends elements of welfare economics and public choice theory. It is methodologically individualistic, in that it aggregates preferences and behaviors of individual members of society. Using elements of formal logic for generality, analysis proceeds from a set of seemingly reasonable axioms of social choice to form a social welfare function (or constitution).[3] Results uncovered the logical incompatibility of various axioms, as in Arrow's theorem, revealing an aggregation problem and suggesting reformulation or theoretical triage in dropping some axiom(s).[1]